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NOTES AND COMMENTS
FAIR-TRADE UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Introduction
Fair-trade may be described as a system of permissive
legislation authorizing producers of trademarked or branded
commodities to fix the resale price of such commodities by con-
tract. These laws, now in effect in the vast majority of states,
were adopted in the depression days to prevent ruinous price wars.
Since that time the battle of fair-trade has been fought out in the
legislatures and more often in the courts. The two lines of attack
have centered around the federal anti-trust laws and the state and
federal constitutions. It is the burden of this paper to trace the
legal landmarks of this conflict and to present the picture of
fair-trade as it exists today.
Backgrouvd
At common law, in England' and in this country prior to
trade regulating statutes,2 price setting contracts were valid when
designed to protect the interests of the parties,3 and did not consti-
tute unreasonable restraints on trade.4 After the passage of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act,5 the Supreme Court decided Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Son Co.,6 in which price maintenance con-
tracts, so far as they affected interstate commerce, were held to
be restraints on trade and violative of the Sherman Act. This
holding did not preclude a manufacturer from refusing to sell to
dealers who would not voluntarily adhere to his preannounced
price listings7 or from fixing prices with outlets which were"genuine agents" of the manufacturer.$ Neither of these alterna-
tives, however, afforded the means for an effective price mainte-
nance programY
1. Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. D. 351 (1880).2. Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88 (1889); Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 602 (1885).
3. Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 (1869).
4. Supra n. 2.
5. 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (Supp. 1951).
6. 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
7. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919).
8. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926).
9. "There were disadvantages to the use of refusal-to-sell and agency methodsof price fixing. The former method was never really effective since the manufacturercould not always prevent the retailer from securing his product from another source.The latter method ,as more effective but subjected the manufacturer to much expenseand market risks, which, otherwise, would have been distributed over many independent
retailers." 1 BFLO. L. Rav. 166 (1951).
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Since the Dr. Miles decision reached only interstate commerce,
nothing prevented price maintenance in intrastate commerce, and
state legislation sanctioning price maintenance began with a New
Jersey statute in 1916.10 Other states soon followed." For prac-
tical purposes, the early statutes proved inadequate, for they
covered only actual parties to the contract. An effective price
setting scheme requires that all dealers of the product be bound,
and in 1933 California enacted the first "nonsignor clause.'
' 2
Under such a provision, all dealers having notice of a fair-trade
price on a product are bound by that price equally with the actual
parties to the contract which set the price.'
3  Such provisions were
held constitutional by the Supreme Court in Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers.-
1
In the meantime, legislation to validate fair trading in inter-
state commerce was attempted. Two bills were introduced in
Congress as early as 1914'1s but were not approved. And at every
session of Congress from 1917 to 1933 fair-trade legislation was
proposed but never enacted. In 1937 success was achieved with
the passage of the Miller-Tydings Act.'" This bill took the form
of an amendment to the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade
Commission Act.17  It simply stated that these federal anti-trust
acts should not apply to "contracts and agreements". prescribing
a.minimum resale price, so long as they were valid under state
law. Though the amendment spoke in terms of "contracts and
agreements" its applicability to nonsignors was not questioned
for fourteen years. Then the Supreme Court decided Scliweg-
wm Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.'
9 and held that the Miller-
Tydings Amendment, since it sanctioned only "contracts and
agreements," did not validate nonsignor provisions. Consequent-
10. N. J. LAWS 1913. c. 210.
11. Today, forty-five states (all except Texas, Vermont and Missouri) and the
territories of Hawaii and Puerto Rico have fair-trade statutes. The District of Columbia
does not.
12. ST. 1931, p. 583, as amended, ST. 1933, p. 793, §11.
13. The California nonsignor provision reads: "Wilfully and kmowingly advertis-
ing, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any con-
tract, entered into pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of this act, whether the person
so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair
competition and is actionable at the suit of any person aggrieved thereby."
14. 299 U. S. 183 (1936). See section on constitutionality, infra.
15. H. R. 13305 and 13860, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
16. 50 STAT. 693, 15 U. S. C. § 1 (Supp. 1951).
17. 38 STAT. 717, 15 U. S. C. §41 (Supp. 1951).
18. Despite the absence of an express nonsignor clause in the Miller-Tydings
Amendment, the Department of Justice assumed its applicability to nonsignors and dis-
continued prosecutions against fair-traders as violators of the Sherman Act. Before the
Temporary National Economic Committee, Assistant Attorney General Thurman
Arnold referred to the terriffic import of the act, and called for its repeal, because it
legalized state nonsignor clauses. TNEC HEAINGS, pp. 18162-18165.
19. 341 U. S. 384 (1951).
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ly, state nonsignor clauses, insomuch as they affected interstate
commerce, were void as violative of the Sherman Act.2 0  About
the same time, another severe blow was struck at fair trade legis-
lation. In the case of Sunbeam v. Wenttinq,2'1 the Third Circuit
held that the Pennsylvania fair-trade statute should be construed
to apply only to intrastate commerce. Since the prices set in
different states can, and do, differ the court concluded that inter-
state sales could not be ordinarily transacted, and held that the
interstate flow of goods was thereby affected. Since state
legislation cannot interfere with interstate commerce, the statute
had to be construed as applying to intrastate commerce only, in
order to be valid at all. -
With these two catastrophic decisions, fair-trade was set back
forty years and rendered virtually ineffective. Without the ability
to set the price of goods in interstate commerce, no price mainte-
nance scheme can succeed. The very existence of the practice




Proponents of fair-trade, scattered in the sudden aftermath
of the Schwegmann and Wentling cases, closed ranks and on
October 17, 1951, introduced the McGuire bill; it became law July
14, 1952.24
The McGuire Act 25 may be characterized as an enabling act.
It does not purport to declare practices to be unfair competition
under federal law. It confers no new powers upon the Federal
Trade Commission to proceed against violators. In reality it
simply removes the barrier of federal anti-trust law from the
application of state fair-trade legislation where interstate com-
merce is involved. In the words of its'sponsor:
20. Since the Miller-Tydings Amendment was construed as not sanctioning the
nonsignor provisions, such clauses had to fall. State legislation, in and of itself, can
in no way legalize a violation of the Sherman Act. Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
21. 185 F. 2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950), vacated 341 U. S. 944 (1951), opinion on remand,
192 F. 2d 7 (1951).
22. The Wentling case was applied, but with difficulty, in Rothbaum v. R. H. Macy,
280 App. Div. 530, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 197 (2d Dep't 1952), and Shakespeare Co. v. Lipp-
man's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N. W. 2d 268 (1952).
23. H. R. 5767, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
24. It is interesting to note that the General Statement of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce summarizing the hearing of its subcommittee, favor-
ably recommended passage of the bill on the ground that the survivorship of small business
was politically desirable despite strong economic and legal arguments against the bill.
II. Rm.. 1437.
25. 66 STAT. 632, 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (Supp. 1952).
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The McGuire bill is merely permissive. It says to the States,
in effect, that the Congress recognizes the rights of the States to
enact and make effective policies respecting unfair competition.
This is all the McGuire bill does and that is all it is intended to
do. (26)
It is clear that Congress has declared no new policy of its own,
except in so far as it recognizes the dichotomous policies of the
various States. In this sense the new legislation is stopgap. But
for the immediate future the McGuire Act marks the end of the
interstate commerce problem in resale price maintenance.
Declaration of Purposes
An analysis of the Act's declaration of purposes reveals that
the new law is designed (1) to protect the rights of the various
States to regulate their own internal affairs, (2) to enact laws
and to adopt policies which authorize resale price maintenance
agreements, (3) to extend the binding effect of such agreements to
nonsignors, and (4) to permit the enforcement of such agreements
in interstate commerce.
An Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act
§ 2 of the new law rewrites, or rather adds to, former § 5 (a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as follows. § 5 (a) (2)
with two exceptions referred to below, is substantially the same
as the first proviso of the Miller-Tydings Amendment. In sub-
stance this paragraph provides that neither the Federal Trade
Commission Act nor any of the antitrust acts27 shall invalidate
contracts fixing minimum or stipulated prices for the resale of
brand name commodities which are in free and open competition
with commodities of the same general class produced by others
when and only when such contracts are lawful under applicable
state law. Thus, if resale price maintenance agreements are valid
under any state law, ipso facto, they are valid under the federal
antitrust laws. The test of validity as far as federal law is con-
cerned, is the same in both the McGuire Act and the Miller-
Tydings Amendment. From the standpoint of federal antitrust
law, such agreements are valid if under applicable state law they
"are lawful as applied to intrastate commerce.' 
2
But § 5 (a) (2) differs from the Miller-Tydings Amendment
in two respects:
26. Statement by Representative McGuire. CONG. REc., 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
May 7, 1952. p. 4979.
27. The term "antitrust acts" as defined in 15 U. S. C. §44 includes the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act.
28. SuPra n. 16, 25.
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(1) It expressly covers contracts which prescribe "minimum
or stipulated prices"; the Miller-Tydings Act only expressly
covered contracts prescribing "minimum prices." ) 2 9
(2) It included a provision expressly covering contracts
requiring a vendee to enter into contracts or agreements pre-
scribing minimum or stipulated prices"; the Miller-Tydings Act
only referred to "contracts or agreements prescribing minimum
prices for the resale of a commodity. " °
§ 5 (a) (3) is new. It completely destroys the holding of the
Schwegmann case. In substance it provides that neither the
Federal Trade Commission Act nor the federal anti-trust laws
shall be construed or applied to render unlawful the "exercise
or the enforcement of any right or right of action" created by
the nonsignor sections of the various state fair-trade laws. Since
the Schuwegmann case ruled that resale price maintenance agree-
ments were unenforceable against nonsignors because of the anti-
trust laws-even though enforceable in intrastate commerce under
state law-this section directly overcomes that holding." § 5 (a)
(4) is new. It is designed to resolve any doubt as to the future
effect of the Wentling case.3 2 In substance the section provides
that neither the making of resale price maintenance agreements,
as outlined in § 5 (a) (2), nor their enforcement against non-
signors, as described in § 5 (a) (3), shall constitute an unlawful
burden or restraint upon or interference with interstate commerce.
§ 5 (a) (5) is substantially the same as the second proviso of the
Miller-Tydings Amendment. It simply reiterates the prohibition
of horizontal price fixing, i. e., by parties on the same level of
distribution.
The importance of the McGuire Act is that it restores to
federal anti-trust law the intent of the framers of the Miller-
Tydings Amendment; that the interstate commerce problem be
eliminated from the resale price maintenjance picture. This the
new law does in most certain terms.
29. Some state laws authorize "stipulated" prices, others "minimum." A minimumprice statute does not authorize a stipulated price, since it permits sales above but notbelow the minimum price. But the states have judicially determined that a minimumprice will be enforced under a stipulated price statute. Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co. Ltd.,200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942) ; Mennen Co. & Meyers Co. v. Kraus Co. Ltd., 134 F. 2d348 (5th Cir. 1943). Hence, a minimum resale price may be prescribed in all fair-tradestates but not necessarily a stipulated price. The new McGuire Act will recognize eithermethod of price fixing if valid under applicable state law.
30. See infra n. 55.
31. That this is the intended effect of the section is clearly shown in the GeneralStatement of the Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
H. R. 1437.
32. Supra n. 21.
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Constitutionality
Fair-trade statutes, insomuch as they validate price-setting
'contracts, present no constitutional problem, for they merely
provide for the enforcement of contract terms against the parties
to the contract. On the other hand, the constitutionality of non-
signor provisions has been continually attacked. The new federal
act, however, presents little difficulty, for it is merely an enabling
act in respect to interstate commerce. In and of itself, it presents
no constitutional question. Furthermore, since the McGuire Act
does expressly only what the Miller-Tydings Act intended, but
failed to do, and since the Miller-Tydings Act has never been
challenged constitutionally since its enactment in 1937, it is very
doubtful whether either of these federal acts is vulnerable to
constitutional attack. State nonsignor statutes, on the other hand,
have provided a large body of litigation, both under the Federal
Constitution and under respective state constitutions.
Validity of State Legislation under the Federal Constitution
The innovation of nonsignor provisions in state fair-trade
statutes immediately raised objections under the Federal Consti-
tution. The Supreme Court decided these issues and established
state legislation as constitutional in Old Dearborn Distribution Co.
v. Seagram Distillers Corp.3 The two basic constitutional objec-
tions made were that such legislation denied due process and equal
protection. The defendant nonsignor argued that as owner of the
product he was deprived of his property right to sell at whatever
price he chose. The court answered this, first of all, by pointing
out that defendant acquired the product with knowledge of the
restriction, which ran with and conditioned the acquisition of the
product. Beyond this the court said, "We are here dealing not
with a commodity alone, but with a commodity plus the brand or
trade-mark which it bears . . .",-1 This additional element repre-
sented the "good will" of the manufacturer, the protection of
which constituted a legitimate police power objective.3 5 The court
went on to hold that the phrases "free and open competition,"
"any commodity," and "any contract entered into" were not so
vague as to render the statute unconstitutional.
The second basic objection took the position that the statutes
conferred a privilege on owners of goods identified by trademark,
33. Supra n. 14.
34. Supra n. 14 at 194.
35. "The primary aim of the law is to protect the property-namely, the good
will-of the producer, which he still owns. The price restriction is adopted as an appro-




brand, or name, but denied the privilege to owners of unidentified
goods. The court stated a basic doctrine to the effect that states
may resort to classification for the purposes of legislation." This
doctrine is limited by the requirement that the classification "must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation . ,,IT Inasmuch as the statute was designed to
protect good will, the classification satisfied this test. Products
identified by a trademark or brand name carry good will, whereas
unidentified goods do not.
Validity of State Legislation under State Constitutions
Attacks on state fair-trade statutes under the respective state
constitutions have taken sundry forms. The most frequent have
been due process 38 and equal protection. 9 These have generally
been answered in the same manner as the Supreme Court did in
the Old Dearborn case. Few state courts upholding fair-trade
against due process and equal protection objections fail to cite
the Old Dearborn decision. 0 Another frequent argument is that
the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to
individuals without adequate standards. The answer to this has
been that there is no delegation at all.41  The statute is definite
and complete as enacted, 42 and merely removes a barrier to cer-
tain business practices. 43 No legislative authority emanates from
the statute.4 Courts have found little difficult7 with the further
objection that such statutes amount to legislative price fixing.4
Fair-trade statutes permit parties to set prices but in no way re-
quire them to.46 Finally, we find incorporated in several state
36. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (1935).
37. Id. at 422.
38. See Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 C. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 177 (1936);
Sheaffer Pen Co. v..Barrett, 209 Miss. 1, 45 So. 2d 838 (1950) ; Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss
Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942) ; Auto Rental Co. v. Lee, 35 Hawaii 77 (1939).
39. See Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A. 2d 176 (1939);
Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N. E. 929 (1936) ; Miles Laboratories Inc.
v. Owl Drug Co., 67 S.D. 523, 295 N. W. 292 (1940).
40. See cases collected at 19 A. L. R. 2d 1139.
41. Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 242, 4 S. E. 2d 524 (1939).
42. Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, supra n. 38.
43. Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 121 N. J. Eq. 585, 191 Atl. 873 (1937).
44. Searx v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, 10 W. 2d 372, 116 P. 2d 756
(1941).
45. Borden Co. v. Schoeder, 182 Ore. 34, 185 P. 2d 581 (1947). The Supreme
Court alluded to this point in the Old Dearborn case, although it does not appear that the
point was argued by the parties. Cf. Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co.,
Inc., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936), overruled by Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Doriman,
273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30 (1937).
46. Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, supra n. 38; Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil,
supra n. 39. The recent federal case of Ely Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 109 F. Supp.
286
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constitutions a clause forbidding monopolies in ordinary busi-
nesses. 47 Courts in states whose constitutions contain such a
clause are frequently confronted with the argument that their
fair-trade act contravenes such a provision.4 8  However, such
arguments have been universally rejected on the grounds that
fair-trade statutes permit vertical and not horizontal price fixing49
and that the product must be in free and open competition with
other commodities of the same general class.50 Consequently, this
type of price maintenance does not lead to monopoly.
One or more of the theories of constitutional validity herein
set out represents the law in all states having fair-trade statutes,
except two. Recently the highest state court of Michigan accepted
the argument that the manufacturer's property right in good will
does not extend to the resale stage; consequently, the court con-
cluded that fair-trade legislation did not constitute a legitimate
exercise of the police power.51 Florida has likewise ruled that its
statute is outside the scope of the police power 52 on the ground
that economic conditions have so changed since the 1930's that
resale price maintenance no longer bears a reasonable relation to
the public welfare. More explicitly, the Florida court took the
position that resale price maintenance serves particular groups,
namely, retailers, by restricting competition. Conceding that
fair-trade may also protect good will, the court, nevertheless,
held that the vantage was personal and not public and that the
statute was therefore unconstitutional.
Fair-Trade in New York
The laws of the jurisdictions which sanction fair-trade are
essentially similar.58 The New York Fair-Trade Law, modeled
after the California act, is found in General Business Law §§ 369
(a)-(e). Its title indicates a threefold purpose:
269 (E. D. La. 1953), felt that Schwegnmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers, supra n. 19,
overruled the Old Dearborn case insomuch as the latter case held that there was no
coercion in a fair-trade statute. This might open a breach for new attack; however, two
recent state courts which considered the issue failed to recognize the argument as valid.
-Frankfort Distillers Corp. v. Liberto, 190 Tenn. 478, 230 S. W. 2d 971 (1950) ; Borden
Co. v. Schoeder. supra n. 45.
47. See LA. CONsT. Art. 19, §§ 14, 18.
48. Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942) ; Goldsmith v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A. 2d 176 (1939) ; Miles Laboratories Corp., Inc.
v. Owl Drug Co., supra n. 39.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Shakespeare Co. v. Lippnan's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109,
54 N.W. 2d 268 (1952), noted, 51 MICH. L. REv. 452 (1953).
52. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., - Fla. , 40 So. 2d 371
(1949).
53. GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR-TRADn LEGISLATION 403-461 (1939).
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An Act to protect trade mark owners, distributors, and the
public against injurious and uneconomic practices in the dis-
tribution of articles of standard quality under a distinguished
trade mark, brand or name.
3 869 (C)14 excludes horizontal resale price maintenance agree-
ments from the operation of the statute. § 369 (a) (1)" permits
vertical price fixing. In substance it authorizes the "producer or
owner" of a brand-name commodity which is in fair and open
competition with similar commodities produced by others to fix
by contract a stipulated resale price, or require any dealer who
may resell his commodity to agree not so to sell except at the
price stipulated. § 369 (b)5 is the nonsignor provision. In sub-
stance it declares that wilfully and knowingly advertising, offer-
ing for sale or selling a commodity at less than the price stipulated
by any contract pursuant to § 369 (a) is unfair competition and
actionable by any person damaged thereby, whether the violator
is or is not a party to the contract. § 369 (d) contains definitions
and § 369 (e) a separability clause.
New Statutory Right of Action
Since § 369 (b) extends to nonsignors the common law right of
a manufacturer to enforce vertical resale price fixing agreements
in intrastate commerce, it is clear that it creates new rights.
This right or right of action is not limited to the contractual lia-
bility of signors. What the statute makes actionable is not termed
a breach of contract but "unfair competition." Violations are
actionable by "any person" damaged. Aside from contract lia-
1
54 "This article shall not apply to any contract or agreement between producers
or between wholesalers or between retailers as to the sale or resale price."
55. "Price fixing of certain commodities permitted:
1. No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or thelabel or content of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer or owner
of such commodity and which is in fair and open competition with commodities of the
same general class produced by others shall be deemed in violation of any law of the
state of New York by reason of any of the following provisions which may be contained
in such contracts:
(a)That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price stipulated by
the vendor;
(b) That the vendee or producer require any dealer to whom he may resell such
commodity to agree that he will not, in turn, resell except at the price stipulated by
such vendor or by such vendee."
56. "Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity
at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of
section three hundred sixty-nine-a, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale
or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at
the suit of any person damaged thereby."
57. Alexander's Department Stores Inc. v. Ohrback's Inc., 180 Misc. 18, 40
N. Y. S. 2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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bility, the statute creates a new cause of action-the intentional
tort of unfair competition."
Elements of the Cotract
The maintenance of a stipulated resale price -will not be en-
forced without a contract. Thus, the pleading and proof of the
existence of such a contract at the time of the alleged violation
are imperative.59 The agreement may be oral and unilateral. But
difficulties of proof -would seem to dictate the desirability of a
written bilateral contracatL6  No particular form is required al-
though most agreements contain identical basic provisions.'- Sat-
isfaction of the statutory requirement of a "contract" has been
given a liberal judicial construction. 2 The agreement must be
supported by consideration; any consideration sufficient to sup-
port. a simple contract is sufficient. 3  To fufil this requirement
an express clause in the contract -whereby the owner or producer
promises diligently to enforce its terms against violators -would
seem desirable, although an implied promise to do so is sufficient
when found.
Usually the contract is made terminable by either party after
a certain number of days' notice. But termination by a dealer
does not end his obligation to observe the stipulated resale price,
if there are still in effect in the state other fair-trade contracts
covering the same commodity 6 4 To invoke the statute it is not
necessary to enter into agreements with all or substantially all
the dealers in a community. It is enough that one agreement is
made indicating an intent to resort to the provisions of the act.6 5
The most essential term of the contract is he resale price.
§ 369 (a) permits a ,"stipulated," not a minimrum" pricey6  The
resale price need not be the market value but -where the price fixed
is not related to the market value equitable enforcement maybe de-
8. Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop v. Miller Bros., 253 App. Div. 188 1 NM Y.
S. 2d 802, aff'd, 254 App. Div. 780, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 147, aff'd, 281 N. Y. 101, 22 '. E. 2d
253 (1939); Burnstein v. Charlenes Cut Rate Drugs, 126 N. . Eq. 560, 10 A. 2d 646
(1940).
39. Katz v. Gezirfz, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Charmley Drug Co. V.
Guerlain, 113 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1940).
60. National Wholesale Druggist's Assn., TzE BAsis Am DzELo .mENT OF
FAR-TRA E 48-58 (2d ed. 1950).
61. For model forms, see supra n. 60 at 175-186; Oppumzim, UxF-AI TpADE
PRAcriCs 1482 et zeq. (1950) ; GmH.E3 supra n. 53 at 343 (1939).
62. Houbigant Sales Corp. v. Woods Cut Rate Store, 123 N. J. Eq. 40, 196 AtI.
683 (1931).
63. Ibd
64. Borden Co. v. Schoeder, supra n. 45.
65. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. -Vussbaum Liquor Store, 166 ' isc. 342, 2 N. Y. S.
2d 320 (1938).
66. For the importance of the distinction, see Tupra n. 29.
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nied.8 7 The price must be actually and definitely fixed by the con-
tract.8 8  A suggested or recommended price will not do. But the
incorporation of the price by reference to a current monthly cata-
logue, in order to meet fluctuating market conditions is permis-
sable." Usually the contract provides that the price be a stated
amount plus all applicable sales and excise taxes. In the absence
of this expressed provision, a tax, which is imposed and collected
from the customer, would automatically add to the fixed price.
But federal excise taxes would not be so added. The difference
depends upon whether the tax statute imposes the tax upon the
seller or the buyer.70
The contract may provide for trade-in allowances. A reason-
able standard for determining the allowance must be set by the
contract. A defense that the contract is too vague in this respect
will not be stricken as frivilous.71
The New York Fair-Trade Law does not specifically require
uniformity of the resale price but such uniformity, at least within
a given competitive area, is implicit in the statute.72 Even though
the contract by its terms applies to all resales, signors and non-
signors are bound only to the extent which the statute prescribes.
§ 369 (a) (2) lists four exceptions which are deemed to be ex-
pressed or implied conditions in every agreement.7 3
Capacity to Fix Price
§ 369 (a) (1) expressly permits the "producer or owner" toinitiate price fixing agreements. '§ 369 (d) defines "producer" to
mean "a grower, baker, maker, manufacturer or publisher." In
about 22 other states, statutory capacity is given a "distributor."
67. Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, supra n. 39; Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental
Distilling Corp., supra n. 52. The Wisconsin statute provides that if the price provisions
of the contract are unfair and unreasonable, the contract may -be declared a restraint
of trade. Wisc. STATUT.S 133.25, subd. 7, LAWS OF 1935 c. 52.
68. Ray Kline Inc. v. Davega City Radio Inc., 168 Misc. 185, 4 N.Y. S. 2d 541
(1938) ; General Electric v. R. H. Macy, 199 Misc. 87, 103 N.Y. S. 2d 440, app. dis-
missed, 278 App. Div. 939, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 1003 (1st Dep't 1951).
69. Schill v. Remington Putnam Book Co., i79 Md. 83, 17 A. 2d 175 (1941).
70. Miles Laboratories Inc. v. Simon, 33 F. Supp. 962 (E. D. Mich. 1940). The
Nevada Act provides that all sales and excise taxes shall be added to the price schedule.
LAWS OF 1937 c. 48.
71. Schimpf v. R. H. Macy & Co., 166 Misc. 654, 2 N.Y. S. 2d 152, rev'd, 254
App. Div. 835, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 328 (1st Dep't 1938).
72. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, supra n. 65.
73. "(a) In closing out the owner's stock for the purpose of discontinuing de-
livery of any such commodity.
(b) When the goods are damaged or deteriorated in quality, and notice is
given to the public thereof.
(c) By an officer acting under the orders of any court.
3. Sales or offers of sale to the state of New York or an administrative
department thereof, political subdivision, municipality, public corporation or authority,
college or university, library or any public library board of regents . . ."
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Both the Miller-Tydings Amendment and the McGuire Amendment
refer to a "producer or distributor." Any difference would seem
nominal. But what is important is that only those within the
terms of the statute may fix resale prices. In New York, this
does not include a wholesaler or a retailer.
74 It has been held
that an exclusive sales agent in New York when authorized by the
manufacturer may fix resale prices.
7 5
Notice Requirements
Notice is required to bind all against whom the contract is
sought to be enforced. The words "wilfully and knowingly" in
§ 369 (b) are the source of this requirement. Notice is required
not only of direct changes in price but also changes in discounts
and other general business practices reflected in the price of a
commodity.71 Signors, by the fact that they are parties to the
agreement, have notice. As to nonsignors it must appear that
they had notice of the price fixing and all changes at the time
of the alleged sale.77  No particular form of notice is necessary;
the requirement merely serves as a basis of proof that the defend-
ant "knowingly" violated the contract.
7 18
Notice does not mean notice of the existence of any particular
contract.79 All that is required is that the defendant knew that
the resale price of the commodity had been fixed by contract.
All commodities purchased before receipt of notice may be
sold at any price even though such sales are made after receiving
notice.80 To hold otherwise would seem to render the statute un-
constitutional.8 ' While the Court of Appeals has reserved deci-
sion on the question, 2 the lower courts have expressly adopted a
constitutional construction." Thus, the pleadings must allege that
74. Automotive Electric Service Corp. v. Times Square Stores Corp., 175 Misc.
865, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
75. Continental Distilling Sales Co. Inc. v. Famous Wines and Liquors Inc., 274
App. Div. 713, 80 N.Y. S. 2d 62 (1st Dep't 1948).
76. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liqior Store, supra n. 65.
77. Doums v. Benetor's Cut Rate Drug Stores, 75 Cal. App. 2d 61, 170 P. 2d
88 (1946).
78. Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Seyopp Corp., 2 N. Y. S. 2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938);
Weco Products Co. v. Sam's Cut Rate Inc., 296 Mich. 190, 295 N. W. 611 (1941).
79. Seagrain-Distillers Corp. v. Seyopp Corp., supra n. 78.
80. Lentheric Inc. v. Weissbard, 122 N.J. Eq. 573, 195 Atl. 818 (1937) ; Charmley
Drug Shop v. Guertain, 113 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1940) ; James Heddon's Sons v. Callender,
29 F. Supp. 579 (D. C. Minn. 1939).
81. Cf. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., supra n. 14.
82. Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop v. Miller Bros., supra n. 58.
83. "The entire theory of the statute is that it applies only to merchandise ac-
quired after knowledge. Were it otherwise, the statute would permit price fixing by fiat,
and it is due to the fact that this is not the tenor of the statute that 
it is constitutional."
Supra n. 78 at 552.
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the defendant, having notice when he acquired the goods, wilfully
offered, advertised or sold below the stipulated price.84
Commodities Covered
Not every owner or producer of a commodity may fix its re-
sale price by contract, despite the fact that § 369 (d) defines "com-
modity" as "any subject of commerce." § 369 (a) (1) only applies
to a commodity "which bears . . . the trade-mark, brand, or
name of the producer or owner . . ." The first fundamental
limitation of all fair-trade legislation is that it only applies to
commodities with good will. 5  Moreover, not every producer or
manufacturer along the successive stages in the fabrication of
such a commodity may fix its resale price. Only the producer
of the "finished or ultimate product" may do so.8 The finished
products test is a judicial limitation. It is qualitative in nature.
If future processes will result in a new and different commodity,
the present fabricator may not fix its resale price.8 7 Thus, only
the owner or producer of a finished commodity which is branded,
trade-marked, or contains the name of the producer may qualify
under § 369 (a) (1).
The second major limitation on qualification under § 369 (a) (1)
is the requirement that the commodity be "in fair and open com-
petition with commodities of the same general class produced by
others . . ." This requirement is found in all fair-trade legis-
lation."8 The theory behind this is that the price set by the con-
tract will be influenced by competition on the market. Thus, even
though a commodity may be given a fixed price by its producer,
such price is itself a result of competition.
The existence of fair and open competition must be proven.
No exact test has been laid down. Generally, such competition
may be said to exist if the resale price, when set too high, would
result in the producers' loss of trade due to the competition of
other similar articles.89 Equally relative is the problem whether
a commodity is of the "same general class." If two articles are
"generally similar" they may be said to be of the same general
84. Katz v. Gevirtz, stpra n. 59.
85. Identical provisions are found in the McGuire and Miller-Tydings Acts.
86. United States v. Univis Lens Co. Inc., 316 U. S. 241 (1942); United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 241 (1944).
87. Mallison Fabrics Co. v. R. H. Macy, 171 Misc. 875, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 213 (Sup.
Ct. 1939) ; cf. Guerlain Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth, 171 Misc. 990, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 163
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
88. The McGuire and Miller-Tydings Amendments differ only in that they use
the term "free," rather than "fair," and open competition.
89. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 158 F. 2d 592 (2d Cir.
1946).
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class even though one or both have unique or distinctive charac-
teristics which cannot be exactly reproduced by a competitor 0
Violations I
. 369 (b) covers not only actual sales but also advertising
and offering for sale; this feature is common to all forty-five state
statutes. No actual sale is necessary to give rise to a cause of
action."'
Who May Enforce the Contract
§ 369 (b) states that a violation is actionable by "any per-
son" damaged. These terms have teen held to include "all par-
ties vendee," whether a distributor, wholesaler or retailer.9 2  A
nonsignor may sue signors or nonsignors. 3 A trade association
may sue.9 4
Remedies
Although there is no specific statutory authority for injunc-
tive relief, the general power of equity to protect property rights
in good will is sufficient to authorize this remedy. 5 Thus, recovery
may be money damages, or inj-dnction against future violations,
or both. 16
The first problem lids in that phrase of the statute which
gives the cause of action. The difficulty is in establishing dam-
ages. The only practical method of enforcement is by way of
injunctive relief .9  To obtain such relief the producer must es-
tablish the existence of good will and unlawful price cutting. No
proof of actual or specific money damages is required; injury to
good will, actual or treatened, is presumed."" New York does not
require proof of pending irreparable injury. 9' This first aspect
of a suit to enforce a fair-trade price has been based on the
premise that a valid and enforcable cause of action exists, and no
defenses are encountered.
90. Columbia Records v. Goody, 278 App. Div. 401, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 659 (1st Dep't1951).91. Le Page v. Automobile Club of New Yo?k, 258 App. Div. 981, 17 N. Y. S.
2d 568 (2d Dep't 1940).
92. Auto Rental Co. v. Lee, supra. n. 38.
93. Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop v. Miiller Bros., supra n. 58.
94. Iowa Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. May's Drug Stores Inc., 229 Iowa 554, 294
N.W. 756 (1940). New York has refused to sanction the incorporation of a member-
ship corporation, the purpose of which was to assist in the enforcement of the fair-trade
law. In re Fair-Trade Enforcement Service Inc., 100 N.Y.L. J. 1337, CCH Trade
Reg. Serv., Par. 25,165 (Kings 1939).
95. Miles Laboratories v. Seignious, 30 F. Supp. 549 (D. C. So. Car. 1937.)
96. Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop v. Miller Bros., supra n. 58.
97. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, supra n. 65..
98. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 177 (1950).
99. Ibid and supra n. 65. Cf. Ely Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., supra rr. 46,
where proof of irreparable injury was required.
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There are several ,defenses available, even though the de-
fendant has in fact sold below the fair-trade price. The defend-
ant may show that the contract does not meet the requirements
of § 369 (a); or lack of knowledge under 4369 (b).
In equitable actions a producer must show "clean hands."
Where the price cutting is general and long-continued, failure to
take effective enforcement measures will be regarded as a waiver
or abandonment of such rights as the contract and statute con-
fer.100 The inequitable conduct of the producer must occur after
the contract has been entered into. 101 However, where previous
enforcement was merely lax, the court will grant the injunction
upon condition that the producer continue its present vigorous
enforcement policies. 10 2 A producer is-not required to sue every
violator nor all violators simultaneously.103 But if he does not
resort to legal action, he is required to use reasonable diligence
to see that none of his products continues to be sold to one who
cuts prices. 0 4
Mere delay in enforcement, not amounting to an estoppel, may
bar recovery for damages but will not preclude injunctive relief. 05
The mere fact that some but not all of the producer's commodities
are price-fixed is no defense. 08 Injunctive relief to protect all
the price-fixed products of a manufacturer will issue even though
a dealer has only cut prices on one.0 7
The task of a competitor who becomes a plaintiff is even more
difficult. He must prove that the price cutting of the defendant,
on a product which may be only one of many which he handles,
has materially affected his business. Here again injunctive relief
is the only practical remedy. It should be noted however, that
the retailer's right of action is not derivative from that of pro-
ducer or owner. His action is not precluded because the producer
has not actively enforced the trade. " * The courts have refused to
grant a retailer a declaratory judgment that a producer has
100. Automotive Electric Service Corp. v. Times Square Stores Corp., supra n. 74;
Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Ackerman, 263 App. Div. 1016, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 937 (2d
Dep't 1942).
101. Columbia Records v. Goody, supra n. 90.
102. General Electric v. R. H. Macy, supra n. 68.
103. Seagram Distillers v. Ackerman, supra n. 100; Calvert Distillers v. Stockman,
26 F. Supp. 73 (E. D. N.Y. 1939).
104. Calvert Distillers v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, supra n. 65.
105. Columbia Records v. Goody, supra n. 90.
106. Ibid.
107. Weisstein v. Freeman's Wines and Liquors Inc., 169 Misc. 391, 7 N.Y.S.
2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
103. Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, supra n. 65; Wilson
Dist. Co. v. Stockman, 11 N.Y. S. 2d 51 (Sup. Ct 1939).
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abandoned his contract on the ground that price cutting may still
be actionable by another'person damaged thereby. 0 9 This is im-
portant, since even though the producer may never effectively
enforce the contract, individual competitors may, nevertheless,
still restrain damaging price cutting within their locality. Only
when the retailer himself has violated the contract will his cause
of action fail.110
The fact that a retailer is also a member of a retail associa-'
tion which polices the trade, or that the relative size of the enter-
prises is lopsided, or that the state of price enforcement is in cha-
otic confusion is irrelevant if clean hands are shown. Whether a
party has clean hands is not simply an issue of actual or prob-
able injury but also involves issues of moral intent and, good
faith."'i
A provision for liquidated damages for each violation would
seem desirable. This would tend to eliminate some of the enfoice-
ment problems. -The courts have not passed upon the validity of
such a clause although there is evidence of its usage." 2 The tra-
ditional test is whether the clause was inserted to compensate
the injured party for damage suffered or to secure performance
of the contract. Of course, the amount must be reasonable."'
A provision for reasonable attorney fees may also be valid."4
All such clauses however are only good against actual parties to
the contract-since a nonsignor's liability is statutory. Once an
injunction issues, any future price cutting subjects the violator
to contempt proceedings." 5
Another interesting aspect of enforcement is the difference
in theory of the action when the suit is by a competitor rather
than a producer. The courts have recognized the twofold pur-
pose of the statute to protect the producer's 'good will and also
competitors and the general public from unfair competition.
-These interests are not the same; the theory of action is not the
same.1 6  Vhile the courts are unanimous in presuming damage
where a producer. shows good will, does this presumption operate
when the retailer initiates the action? Do competitors have a
109. Stockman v. Wilson Distilling Co., 175 Misc. 314, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 510, aff'd,
261 App. Div. 919, 26 N.Y. S. 2d 510 (2d Dep't 1941); Weissbard z. Potter Drug and
Chemical Co., 6 N.J. Super. 451, 69 A. 2d 559 (1949).
110. Weisstein v. Peter Corbyon L. S., 174 Misc. 1075, 22 N.Y. S. 2d 510 (Sup.
Ct. 1940); Fogel v'. Bolet, 194 Misc. 1019, 91 N.Y. S. 2d 642 (Sup. Ct 1949).
111. Ibid.
112. Supra n. 60 at 116-119.
113. 3 Wn.usoN, CoNTRAcrs, §§775-6 (rev. ed. 1936).
114. Id.
115. Palmer v. Angert, 275 App. Div. 965, 90 N.Y. S. 2d 745 (2d Dep't 1949).
116. 25 NoTm DAmsE LAW. 529 (1950).
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property in the producer's good will? The damages suffered by
a competitor would seem to be loss of business rather than injury
to good will. However, one case has held that a retailer does
have an "interest" in the producer's good will. 17 Another court
granted the retailer an injunction upon a finding that damage was
"obvious," without indicating whether the damage went to loss
of good will or loss of business."8  Regardless of the precise
theory of the presumption of damage, in the case of retailers, the
presumption is nevertheless present, and the courts have con-
stantly granted equitable relief at their behest.
Conchlsion.
In respect to the interstate problem, which has troubled fair-
trade since 1911, it seems that the new federal statute is a near
cure-all. The holdings of the Schwegmann and iFentling cases
have been neutralized. The statute is clear to the effect that non-
signor clauses in interstate commerce are valid and operative.
It is equally clear that state fair-trade legislation shall here-
after constitute no burden on interstate commerce legally. It
would seem, therefore, that fair-trade is now soundly established
and is to enjoy a bright future. Reflection reveals, however, the
possibility of difficulty. The constitutionality of fair-trade stat-
utes under the Federal Constitution is based on the theory that
fair-trade protects the good will of the producer. If, upon reexam-
ination of this premise, it should appear that such legislation is
now propounded for other reasons, perhaps because of changed
economic conditions, the force of the Old Dearborn case would
wane and perhaps completely fail. The Federal District Court in
Ely Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros.,' 9 expressly and properly,
left the problem for the Supreme Court.
Under existing circumstances, however, fair-trade ultimately
depends for its validity and existence, on the law of the respective
states. The federal scheme aids only such fair-trade legislation
as is valid under state law. Until recently, such validity was justly
assumed; however, the action of Michigan and Florida, in de-
claring their statutes unconstitutional, is to be noted. A predic-
tion as to whether these two decisions indicate a developing trend
would be wholly premature. For the present, fair-trade legisla-
tion is valid in forty-three of the forty-five states which have such
statutes.
Neil R. Farmelo
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